Neptune's Inferno! Must reading!!

A GREAT read Crash!:applause:

Sending DDs and CAs/CLs against battleships. Because they had to.

Not to "dis" the USMC - you can't, cause they are heroes. The "where was the navy" in the first days of Guadacanal are explained well here, and the fact that more sailors died defending Guadacanal than Marines.

Another sobering example of self sacrifice by the greatest generation.
 
Yep just read after I bought and downloaded e-book. Thought if I liked the e-book... cheaper @ 14.99


http://www.amazon.com/Neptunes-Inferno-U-S-Guadalcanal-ebook/dp/product-description/B004C43FXE

.... then I will buy the hardbound copy..... which I will.

Ratio of 3 sailors died for every 1 Marine Aug-Nov 1942. Great read... cannot stress what a good book this is. Some interesting trivia and insights to the leaders... the Admirals leading the task forces and the Theater leaders Ghormley/Halsey.

The section covering Nov 13th with Callahan/Scott was amazing. Bad feelings after that battle all around.... of course covered Gilbert Hoover's decision to sail on after the Juneau's explosion.... and getting sacked by Halsey...particularly based on Miles Browning recommendation.


Give me SC radar and a Cleveland class CL sporting 15 6/47 guns and I would feel pretty good going in at night.
 
A shame Cleveland was't available till later. Sadly, lack of ship battle knowledge by USN commanders, lack of training for the crews, and failure of the "commanders" to appreciate or rely on the new technology (ie radar) caused many deaths. No US ships were involved in naval battles since 1898! Funding for the Navy for 15 years was a joke. Green crews and skippers were the norm. So was underestimating Japanese equipment and abiity.

It's easy to monday morning quarterback, so I have to think that the leaders did the best they could, made the best decisions they were capable of and Ghormley and Scott among them paid with their lives. Japanese accounts of the friday November 13, 1942 battle showed that the US cruisers/DDs did pepper the upper works of the BB Hiei with over >>100!<< 5, 6 and 8" hits. 15-20 rounds per minute for the 5' 38s astounded the Japanese. The BB's heavy armour saved the vital spaces, aircraft got her the next day.

Radar usage and seasoned commanders might have saved some US ships, but it was not to be.

The failure to provide adequate anti sub screening shows how far behind the US was in 1942, but looking to the Atlantic in the same timeframe, I guess we were just average, not having equipment, training or being put to the test like the Brits/Canadians for 3 years. It seems the neutrality escort knowledge learned in the Atlantic stayed there.

That failure caused losses until the end of the war. Why did Indianapolis sail ALONE?:guinness:
 
I just finished this book! And excellent read! It made me go and find The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors...
 
Well the Americans had to learn their lessons with protecting their carriers in an anti-submarine screen... and predictably took some lumps. Losing Wasp and Saratoga (repeatedly) surely hurt. Not to mention the sinking of Juneau and the torpedoing of the North Carolina in the same torpedo spread that sank Wasp and a destroyer! Surely the luckiest torpedo spread of the war.


The Royal Navy had their issues too though.

8-11-42 HMS Eagle sunk by 3 torpedoes from U-73 in the Med on a Malta convoy.

11-13-41 HMS Ark Royal sunk by 1 torpedo from U-81

9-17-38 HMS Courageous sunk by 2 torpedoes from U-29 off the Irish coast whilst on anti-submarine patrol with a screen of destroyers.
 
True Crash, it seems most combatants sub commanders used their craft to the best of their ability. One other factor in the Pacific - the RANGE of the Japanese torpedoes. You tend to think the enemy has the same stuff you do. Poor assumption in this case. :guinness:

Another for you: "The Fleet the Gods Forgot" by W.G. Winslow - sad story of the Asiatic Fleet pub. -1982. He served aboard the Houston

PRB: great book! enjoy!
 
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