Watched the movie for the first time, since it was on the “Dish”. It was an ok movie, but one thing caught my attention. In the movie, the implication is that the remarkable record this group had with respect to bombers lost while on escort missions was due to their decision to “stick with the bombers” rather than go off chasing Me-109s, presumably at the expense of the bombers.
I'm sure Hollywood screwed this point up, or at least over simplified it, but I haven't read anything specifically on the Red Tails in WW-II, so can't say what “new tactics” they may have employed. We do know that this debate over the most effective way to conduct a bomber escort mission was a heated one in the early years of the war, with fighter pilots generally believing that staying glued to the bombers was a horrible idea, and bomber pilots thinking otherwise. I've read accounts of RAF fighter pilots commenting that the German tactic of sticking with the bombers made their job, shooting down bombers, easier, which would seem to settle the matter. I've also read in histories of the 8TH AF that it wasn't until the fighters were “turned loose” to chase after German fighters, that we really began to have an effect on the German fighter forces.
So what's the consensus here on this? I haven't read about the 8TH and 15TH bomber offensive over Europe in many years, having had my nose buried in Pacific War history for some time. I've always thought the USAAF learned “as a whole”, during the war, that “sticking with the bombers” was bad tactics.
- Paul
I'm sure Hollywood screwed this point up, or at least over simplified it, but I haven't read anything specifically on the Red Tails in WW-II, so can't say what “new tactics” they may have employed. We do know that this debate over the most effective way to conduct a bomber escort mission was a heated one in the early years of the war, with fighter pilots generally believing that staying glued to the bombers was a horrible idea, and bomber pilots thinking otherwise. I've read accounts of RAF fighter pilots commenting that the German tactic of sticking with the bombers made their job, shooting down bombers, easier, which would seem to settle the matter. I've also read in histories of the 8TH AF that it wasn't until the fighters were “turned loose” to chase after German fighters, that we really began to have an effect on the German fighter forces.
So what's the consensus here on this? I haven't read about the 8TH and 15TH bomber offensive over Europe in many years, having had my nose buried in Pacific War history for some time. I've always thought the USAAF learned “as a whole”, during the war, that “sticking with the bombers” was bad tactics.
- Paul